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Aspects of compatibility and the 
construction of preference
Marcus Selart
O ne of the most powerful concepts for understanding and aiding judge­
ments and decisions is compatibility. There are .several rea.sons For this. 
To begin with, compatibility has an impact on many types of perceptual 
and motor performances. This is because the difficulty o f a specific task 
depends on the particular sets of stimuli and re.sponses that arc used in- 
it. O f  special importance is how the stimuli and respon.ses are paired with 
each other. For instance, many studies in cognitive psychology have 
revealed that subjects’ responses are faster and more accurate if they are 
compatible with the stimuli. Conset|uently. as has been pointed out by 
Shalir (1995). subjects’ responses to a pair of lights a.ssigned to a pair of 
keys are faster and more accuraie if the left light is a.ssigned to the left 
key and the right light to the right key (Fitts and Seeger. 1953; Wickens. 
1984). Furthermore, a pointing response is faster than a vocal response 
when a visual stimulus is presented, whereas the reverse holds true when 
the stimulus consists of an auditory me.ssage (Brainard et al.. 1962). 
Compatibility between stimulus and respon.ses has also been shown to 
be salient for a broad range of other perceptual and motor performance 
tasks (see. e.g., Kornblum  ei al.. 1990 and Proctor and Reeve. 1990. for 
reviews).
It has recently been shown that the compatibility between input and 
output is also a factor in how people construct their preferences in 
reasoning and decision making. Shafir (1995) has argued that compati­
bility may contribute to a broad range o f biases, including confirmatory 
biases (Barsalou, 1992), congruence biases (Baron. 1994), verification 
biases (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1970) and matching biases (Evans, 
1984,1989). It is argued that violations of the normative principles under­
lying these forms o f biases are due to people’s tendency to focus on those 
instances that are more compatible with the instructions or with the tested 
hypotheses. A n  implication of these assumptions is that compatibility 
between the way in which decision alternatives are described and the way 
responses are expressed has an impact on how preferences are finally 
constructed (see, e.g., Slovic, 1995, for a review).
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The preference reversal phenomenon has to a large extent contributed 
to the understanding of the role of compatibility in cognition and deci­
sion (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). A  preference reversal is said to occur 
when an individual prefers one alternative in one procedure, but reveals 
a different preference order in another procedure. For instance, it has 
been shown that subjects who are presented with two normatively equiv­
alent gambles with the same expected value often make a choice of the 
gamble with the higher probability. A t the same time they indicate a 
higher selling price for the one with the higher pay-off. Consequently, 
making a choice between two gambles seems to involve other psycho­
logical processes than when the alternatives are being priced separately. 
The idea of compatibility was introduced as a possible explanation of the 
preference reversal phenomenon. Compatibility seemed to be able to 
explain why naming a prize for the gambles was dependent on the pay­
off information to such a large extent. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) 
suggested that the compatibility between an attribute and the actual 
response has an impact on that attribute’s influence when the response is 
made. This reasoning eventually resulted in the scale compatibility hypoth­
esis, which states that the weight of a stimulus attribute in a decision or 
a judgement is increased by its compatibility with the response mode (see, 
e.g., Slovic et al., 1990; Tversky, 1977; Tversky ei al., 1988). The hypoth­
esis finds support in process tracing studies that have shown that response 
scales may prime the attention to the compatible attribute: pricing judge- 
ments prime attention to the amount to be won just as rating scales prime 
the attention to probabilities (Schkade and Johnson, 1989). In line with 
this. Chapman and Johnson (1994) reported that scale compatibility occurs 
if an anchor and a preference judgement are expressed on the same scale. 
It was also shown by Chapman and Johnson (1995) that semantic cate­
gorisation is an important feature of scale compatibility. In life expectancy 
evaluations, health items were preferred to commodities, whereas in 
monetary evaluations commodities were preferred to health items.
A  parallel line of reasoning emanates from the results of Slovic (1975). 
In this study, subjects were instructed to make a choice between two 
equally attractive alternatives. The participants first matched different 
pairs of alternatives, in that they equated the values of the alternatives 
of each pair (see below for details of this procedure). Later on, they were 
instructed to make a choice between the matched alternatives. Slovic 
found that subjects did not make their choices at random, but instead 
tended to choose the alternative that dominated on the most important 
attribute. This reasoning led to the introduction of the prominence hypoth­
esis (Tversky et al., 1988), which implies that the most important or 
prom inent attribute looms larger in choice than in matching. The hypoth­
esis thereby asserts that people tend to make choices according to 
the most important dimension, but they match options by comparing
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trade-offs along dimensions. For instance, Tversky et al. (1988) dem on­
strated tliat the majority of their subjects chose the alternative that 
dom inated on the prominent attribute, even though subjects in a parallel 
task favoured the other alternative.
Tversky et al. (1988) suggested that different heuristics or computational 
schemes may have been triggered in the two types of task. The qualita­
tive nature of choice was seen as more likely than the quantitative nature 
of matching to lead to a preference for the alternative that dominated on 
the prominent attribute. This idea was elaborated by Fischer and Hawkins 
(1993), who suggested that the prominence effect was not restricted to 
choice and matching, but could be generalised to any comparison between 
qualitative and quantitative preference tasks. They termed their notion 
the strategy compatibility hypothesis.
T O W A R D S  A  S T R U C T U R E  C O M P A T IB IL IT Y  M O D E L
This chapter aims to present a new cognitive model of compatibility which 
has been briefly introduced elsewhere (Selart, 1996; Selart et al., 1995). It 
argues that significant compatibility effects can be attributed to how the 
information is structured and organised in input and output.
As may be seen in Figure 4.1, the model assumes that a compatibility 
test between the output and the input initially takes place (1). Here, 
whether the information structure in input is compatible with the infor- 
mation structure of the response mode in output is tested. This test has 
implications for the selection of decision strategy (2). A  lack of compat­
ibility will result in the use of a non-compensatory strategy, whereas 
compatibility between input and output will lead to the use of a compen­
satory strategy. The use of decision strategy will in turn affect both the 
evaluation of the decision outcomes (3) and the implementation of the 
judgement or decision (4).
Building on the results of Payne (1982) and Hawkins (1994), it is 
suggested that two general classes of variables play a major part in how 
subjects construct their preferences. These are task and context effects. 
Task effects can be related to manipulations of the general structure of 
the decision, including response mode, number o f options or attributes, 
time pressure and presentation constraints (Bettman, 1982; Klayman, 1985; 
Russo and Dosher, 1983). Context effects, on the other hand, are 
connected to manipulations of the content of the decision problem, 
involving attribute values, similarity o f alternatives, attribute covariation, 
and overall attractiveness of alternatives (Casey, 1991; Johnson et al., 1988; 
Stone and Schkade, 1991).
Am ong the task variables, response mode has perhaps been most 
investigated. As was shown above, earlier models of compatibility empha­
sised the idea that response mode may either enhance the weight of the
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Task
—  >■ Implementation 
(4) ------------------------
Figure 4.1 A conceptual model of structure compatibility
compatible value attribute (scale compatibility) or prime a particular deci­
sion strategy (strategy compatibility). These are alternative explanations 
of how the response mode in output affects the input (1). The structure 
compatibility model takes as its point of departure that there are deci­
sions and judgements that prime the same decision strategy because of 
the compatibility between input and output. A n  important implication of 
this is that prominence effects may also occur in judgements. Empirical 
findings reveal that prominence effects are not restricted to choices. It has 
been amply shown that the prominent attribute looms larger also in pref­
erence ratings (Fischer and Hawkins, 1993; Montgomery et al.. 1994; 
Selart. 1996; Selart et al., 1995; Selart et al., 1994). That is. subjects rate 
the alternative that dominates on the prom inent attribute as more attrac­
tive despite the fact that both alternatives have previously been judged 
as equally attractive in a matching procedure. Hence, it is assumed that 
the prominence effect cannot be explained in terms o f different strategies 
evoked by judgements and decisions in a general sense. Instead, it is 
proposed that the prominence effect is due to differences in compatibility 
between the required output and the structure o f input information.
Sim ilar ideas, emphasising the role of structure compatibility, have been 
put forward by Schkade and Kleinmuntz (1994), who suggest that organ­
isation of elements strongly influences information acquisition strategies. 
Creyer and Johar (1995) have also noted that task characteristics such as 
the number of attributes used to describe alternatives influence the prom i­
nence effect. We think that similar task demands in choices and preference 
ratings display a common organisational principle that is different from 
the one used in matching.
There is also research indicating that compatibility effects may be 
produced by manipulation of the context. For instance, Parducci (1968, 
1974) has shown that different scale continua may influence how a given
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stimulus is being weighted and judged. One of the findings in his studies 
was that subjects judged a particular pay-off as satisfying in one such scale 
continuum but unsatisfying in another. Meilers and Cooke (1994) reported 
that attribute range influenced the perception of attribute values. It was 
shown that the effects of a given attribute were greater when presented 
within a narrow range than within a wide range. This held true for both 
single-attribute and multiattribute judgements. For example, a monthly 
rent of $400 seemed worse in a narrow rent range than in a wide rent 
range.
In this chapter it is assumed that the range of values in the attribute 
levels of a decision task influences the prominence effect: wide ranges are 
assumed to increase the effect whereas narrow ranges are thought to 
decrease it. The rationale behind this notion is that wide ranges stimu­
late the use of a lexicographic decision strategy, whereas narrow ranges 
facilitate the use of an additive strategy. Moreover, it must be pointed 
out that neither the scale compatibility hypothesis nor the strategy compat­
ibility hypothesis predicts any effects of value ranges.
In the following sections of the chapter, structure compatibility is 
demonstrated in two empirical studies of preferences. A  description of 
the cognitive processes involved is also given in one of the studies where 
a verbal protocol analysis is performed.
S T U D Y  1: M A T C H IN G , P R E F E R E N C E  
A N D  V A L U E  R A N G E
In many studies a paradigm has been used in which subjects’ response 
outcomes in a matching task are directly compared with their preference 
statements in choice (e.g., Tversky et al. 1988). Building on the model 
used by Slovic (1975) we, however, let subjects first perform a matching 
task, in which they were instructed to make pairs o f alternatives equally 
attractive (Selart, 1996). We then let subjects state their preferences for 
the alternatives to see whether, for instance, they were choosing at random 
or whether a bias in terms o f a prominence effect could be detected.
A  new feature of this study was that the value ranges between the 
attribute levels were manipulated both in the matching task and in the 
preference task. Thus, in the matching task values on both attributes were 
expressed on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The alternatives were 
constructed by systematically varying the range between the highest and 
the lowest value on each attribute in steps of 5, 10,15, 20 or 25 (see Table 
4.1). The subjects were undergraduate students at Göteborg University. 
They were asked to imagine that they were suffering from a disease, and 
in each problem a pair of treatments were shown. Their task was to 
provide a missing value so that the options were experienced as equally 
attractive. The order in which the missing attribute levels were presented
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was counterbalanced. In the analysis of the matching task we calculated 
the mean weight ratios between the dimensions in which the mean differ­
ences between each attribute were divided.' These results revealed that 
the attribute which we had hypothesised to be experienced as the more 
important one in fact also turned out to be the prominent one. However, 
an analysis of variance yielded no reliable effects of value range.
In a subsequent experiment, the mean weight ratios obtained in the 
matching task were used to construct new sets of stimulus alternatives. In 
this experiment, subjects’ preferences were elicited terms of choices and 
preference ratings. Also in these tasks the value ranges between the 
attribute levels were subject to manipulation, as can be seen in Table 4.2.
The instructions were the same as in the matching task, except that 
subjects were asked to choose between or to rate the options. Choices 
and preference ratings were scored equivalently, by means of a recoding
Table 4.1 Example of stimuli used in the matching task (Study 1)
Value ranges
Pair 05 10 15 20 25
1 30 3C1 35 \ 30 30 40 30 30 45 ^ 1 30 30 50 30 301 55
2 35 X, 3C1 35 40 X, 30 40 45 30 45 50 Y 30 50 55 301 55
3 35 3Ö 35 40 36 40 45 30 45 50 30 50 55 36 ^3 554 35 30 3^1 40 30 38 ^4 45 30 3Ö ^4 50 30 36 ^4 55 30 30 ^4
Notes:
1 X, Highest value on the prominent attribute missing
2 Xj Lowest value on the prominent attribute missing
3 Xj Lowest value on the non-prominent attribute missing
4 X, Highest value on the non-prominent attribute missing
Table 4.2 Examples of stimuli used in the preference task (Study 1)
Value ranges Options Prominent
attribute
Non-prominent
attribute
Narrow Treatment A 41' 36
Treatment B 36 46
Narrow Treatment A 42 37
Treatment B 37 47
Wide Treatment A 41 1
Treatment B 1 78
Wide Treatment A 42 2
Treatment B 2 79
Note: 1 The values of the prominent and the non-prominent attributes are expressed 
on a scale ranging from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high)
-(>■
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procedure. In this procedure, preferences for the alternative which dom i­
nated on the prominent attribute and preferences for the alternative which 
was dominated on the same attribute received identical scores in both 
procedures.
Prominence effects were found in all conditions, that is, both for choices 
and ratings (see Figure 4.2). The results also revealed that the prominence 
effect was reliably weaker when the value range was narrow than when 
it was wide.
One may ask why the manipulation of the value ranges had an impact 
on the prominence effect in these preference tasks, while it did not affect 
the mean weight ratios in the matching task. A  possible explanation might 
be that if the range of values is wide between the attribute levels in, for 
instance, the choice task, then subjects to a greater extent really must 
‘make a choice between the dimensions’, and then the prom inent attribute 
becomes more salient. If, on the other hand, the ranges are narrow in the 
choice task, then a trade-off between the dimensions will be facilitated, 
leading to the use of a compensatory decision strategy. The same 
reasoning applies to preference ratings in which the structure of the task 
is similar to the one in choice. However, in the matching task this 
‘either/or’ conflict is not to the same extent increased by the wide value 
ranges.
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
<B 0.7
I 0.6 
I 0.5
CO
O
c 0.4
COa>
^  0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0
Choice
Preference rating
Narrow Wide
Value range
Figure 4.2 Mean response score for different value ranges in Study 1
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S T U D Y  2: A  V E R B A L  P R O T O C O L  A N A L Y S IS
Another issue which must be discussed is how this suggested notion of 
structure compatibility can be measured. Generally, it may be argued that 
the ratio between the attention given to the input and the output of a 
task may provide such a measure. But when considering the matching 
task/preference task anomaly, perhaps subjects also pay more attention 
overall to the attribute levels in the matching task than they do in a pref­
erence task. I f  so, then this lower degree
of attention could explain the presence of the prominence effect. It may 
also be plausible to assume that subjects give a more balanced amount of 
attention to both attributes in the matching task, and that in this task they 
also compare the attribute levels more often than they do in a preference 
task.
In order to test these ideas, we designed another study in which the 
use of verbal protocols was introduced (Selart et al., 1995). Silent control 
conditions were also conducted (see Russo et al., 1989, for a discussion). 
The matching task and the preference tasks were constructed and analysed 
in much the same way as in the first study. An extension was that in the 
present study we also used acceptance decisions as a complement to 
choices and preference ratings. Undergraduate students at Göteborg
Table 4.3 Attribute levels of choice problems (medical treatments) presented 
to subjects (Study 2).
Attribute Option 1 Option 2
1 Medical care' (1-100) 65 54
Freedom from disturbance (1-100) 47 62
2 l-lealth improvement (1-100) 61 52
Comfort (1-100) 48 64
3 Efficiency (1-100) 56 47
Pain relief (1-100) 46 58
4 Medical skill (1-100) 59 42
Freedom from fees (1-100) 35 55
5 Food value (1-100) 66 51
Size of food portions (1-100) 49 63
6 Protection against relapse (1-100) 55 40
Program shortage (1-100) 35 52
7 Medical follow-up (1-100) 56 43
Freedom from encroachment (1-100) 28 59
8 Communication with staff (1-100) 66 51
Leisure (1-100) 46 63
Note: 1 Prominent attribute underlined
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University once again served as subjects. The problems which were used 
are shown in Table 4.3. For each problem, we predicted that one attribute 
would be prom inent and the other one non-prominent.
O ur predictions about the salience of these attributes were confirmed, 
technically, since the mean weight ratios of the matching task were higher 
than 1.0 for every condition, with some variation (see Table 4.4).
Prominence effects were revealed in all preference tasks, that is, all 
levels reliably differed from the chance level of 0.50 (Table 4.5).
The processing of the verbal protocols followed a procedure which has 
been developed in previous research (e.g., Harte et al.. 1994: Svenson,
1989; see also Chapter 2). Each statement was coded with respect to (a) 
which of the alternatives, if any, it referred to; (b) which of the attrib­
utes, if any, it referred to; and (c) whether subjects compared two attribute 
levels or attended to a single attribute level. The results are displayed in 
Table 4.6.
The analysis of the verbal protocols revealed that the prominence effects 
obtained in the preference tasks were accompanied by a lower degree of 
attention to the attribute levels. Subjects also compared attribute levels 
less frequently in the preference tasks than in the matching task. However, 
the enhanced attention to the prominent attribute that should have been 
found in the preference tasks was not as clear-cut.
Still, both the generality of the prominence effect in the preference 
tasks and the obtained process differences between the matching task and 
the preference tasks reveal that different kinds of decision strategies seem 
to be involved in the two kinds of tasks, leading to prominence effects in *
the preference tasks.
Table 4.4 Mean ratios of weights for prominent and non-prominent attributes 
in the matching task by preference task (Study 2)
Choice Acceptance decision Preference rating
Think-aloud condition 
Silent condition
1.05
1.28
1.24
1.32
1.11
1.36
Table 4.5 Mean response scores for choice, acceptance decision and prefer­
ence rating (Study 2)
Response mode
Choice Acceptance decision Preference rating
Think-aloud Condition 
Silent condition
0.86
0.83
0.72
0.76
0.70
0.68
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Table 4.6 Means of attention to attribute levels in the think-aloud condition 
(Study 2)
Prominent option Non-prominent Option
Prominent Non-prominent 
attribute attribute
Prominent Non-prominent 
attribute attribute
Choice condition
Matching tasl<
Attribute levels compared 3.75 3.67 3.58 3.83
Attribute levels attended singly 0.25 0.50 0.47 0.58
Preference tasl<
Attribute levels compared 1.00 0.58 0.50 0.08
Attribute levels attended singly 0.67 0.75 0.17 0.42
Acceptance decision condition
Matching task
Attribute levels compared 2.83 2.67 2.75 2.92
Attribute levels attended singly 2.50 1.08 1.17 2.33
Preference task
Attribute levels compared 1.17 1.00 1.08 0.92
Attribute levels attended singly 0.58 0.17 0.75 0.67
Preference rating condition
Matching task
Attribute levels compared 4.83 3.33 4.17 2.83
Attribute levels attended singly 3.00 2.50 1.58 3.75
Preference task
Attribute levels compared 1.00 0.75 1.67 1.42
Attribute levels attended singly 1.58 0.83 1.17 1.00
The observed process differences also provide an example o f how the 
issue of compatibility can be studied with cognitive data. These data sug­
gest that a low degree of attention to the attribute levels, especially in terms 
of performed comparisons, seems to be crucial for the prominence effect.
D IS C U S S IO N
In this chapter, it has been shown that structure compatibility effects 
can be attributed to manipulations both o f the task and the context. In 
two studies, manipulations of the task showed that prominence effects 
may occur in both choices and preference ratings. This finding was in 
line with the model which states that choices and preferences involve 
the same processing mechanism, which is different from the one used 
in the matching task. Neither the scale compatibility nor the strategy
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compatibility hypotheses can explain this finding. The scale compatibility 
hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988) prescribes the absence o f a prominence 
effect in the rating condition during the described circumstances. This is 
because the attribute levels used in the present studies ranged from 1 to 
100 for both the prominent and the non-prominent attributes, as did the 
response scales for preference ratings. This should have resulted in a more 
equal weighting of the attributes in preference ratings than in choices, 
according to the hypothesis. The failure o f the hypothesis corroborates 
earlier findings that suggest that scale compatibility may operate more 
readily if prominence effects are absent. The strategy compatibility 
hypothesis (Fischer and Hawkins, 1993) also suggests a stronger prom i­
nence effect in choice, since different kinds of reasoning are assumed to 
be inherent in choices and judgements independently of the information 
structure: qualitative response modes are assumed to prime qualitative 
decision strategies, whereas quantitative response modes are assumed to 
prime quantitative decision strategies. These differences will in turn lead 
to differential weighting mechanisms in judgement and choice.
Context effects were investigated by the introduction of different value 
ranges in Study 1. It was found that, although different value ranges did 
not have an impact on the weights of the attributes in the matching task, 
they did affect the prominence effect in both choice and preference rating 
data. Neither the scale nor the strategy compatibility hypotheses make 
any context assumptions. However, recent models provided by Mellers 
and Cooke (1996) may suggest predictions which can be integrated into 
the model.
Furthermore, an analysis of verbal protocols in Study 2 revealed that 
subjects made more comparisons between the attribute levels in the 
matching task than they did in the preference tasks. This finding is in line 
with the predictions of the model, which assumes that the use of decision 
strategy should be influenced by the degree of structure compatibility. 
Similar results have been reported by Hawkins (1994). He tested a set 
of hypotheses of which a majority concerned processing differences 
(response time, fixation time) between choice and matching tasks. A  
computerised information board technique was used in the empirical 
investigation. First of all, the prominence effect was replicated. It was also 
found that the matching task in relation to choice had (i) longer total 
response times, (ii) acquisition of more information, and (iii) longer rela­
tive fixation times for the prominent attribute. Furthermore, it was found 
that a prominence effect between choice and matching could be attrib­
uted to relative attention paid to the prom inent attribute in choice. These 
results show clear similarities with the ones obtained in our verbal protocol 
analysis in which matching and choice also were compared. However, our 
model also accounts for similar processing differences between matching 
and preference rating data.
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Taken together, our results - and the empirical examples presented 
from other studies - indicate that it seems necessary to introduce a contin­
gent weighting mechanism that assigns equal importance to input and 
output information. A  structure compatibihty model has therefore been 
proposed in which the importance of both task and context effects is 
emphasised. From a general point of view, it can be assumed that models 
of compatibility in judgement and decision must be complex in nature, 
allowing predictions based on the interaction of several factors. Task 
effects can be attributed to manipulations of the general structure of the 
decision, including response mode, number of options or attributes, time 
pressure and presentation constraints (Bettman. 1982; K layman, 1985;
Russo and Dosher, 1983). Context effects, on the other hand, can be 
connected to manipulations of the content of the decision problem, 
involving attribute values, similarity of alternatives, attribute covariation 
and overall attractiveness of alternatives (Casey et al., 1988: Stone 
and Schkade, 1991). It is suggested that the notion of structure compati­
bility will benefit from future research implying both these classes of 
variables.
N O T E
1 The analyses of the results rested on the assumption that
Up.,+ “ p.np = S p.P+1*NP.„P ( •)
where and denote the attractiveness of the levels of the prominent |
and non-prominent attributes for the prominent option (with the highest value 
on the prominent attribute), and and the corresponding attrac­
tiveness of the levels of the prominent and non-prominent attributes for the 
non-prominent option. If the objective attribute levels are denoted .t and it is 
assumed that i .^-= wXj. with w. denoting the attribute weights, then by substi­
tution in Equation I:
“  ( ’^NP.np “  ^ P , i ip ) ^ ( ^ P .p  “  ’^N P .p ) P )
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